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INTRODUCTION
Steve Subrin is the chronicler par excellence of the American procedural
past. His histories of the Field Code and the origins of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure know no equal.1 The extent to which Prof. Subrin’s work occupies
the field would be frustrating to an aspiring historian of American civil procedure, were he not such a uniquely kind and generous colleague. I will not, however, dwell on Prof. Subrin’s unmatched achievements as a legal historian in
my contribution to this festschrift celebrating his career.2 Rather, I mention this
scholarship to support a claim. If those who know history best understand the
present, then Prof. Subrin is a particularly good interpreter of American civil
procedure’s current era.
I wish it were otherwise because Prof. Subrin has surveyed our procedural
present and does not like what he sees.3 Since the 1970s, changes to the American procedural system have “eviscerated the core values of the Federal Rules,
namely simplicity, uniformity, access to courts, decisions on the merits, and attorney latitude.”4 According to Prof. Subrin’s critique, today’s procedural doctrine fails to vindicate claims accurately and reliably, denies litigants opportunities to participate, and undermines core duties and commitments of our three
branches of government.5
To Prof. Subrin, one of the current era’s worst developments is the disappearance of the civil trial, a phenomenon he has lamented with passion for decades.6 The civil trial’s demise should cause alarm for many reasons, Prof.
Subrin believes, but chiefly for the harm it inflicts on American democracy.7
When juries decide cases, elites lose their stranglehold on legal power and citi1

Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115 (Peninah R.Y. Petruck
ed., 1991); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin,
Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909
(1987).
2
My own historical work reflects his influence. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present,
and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 387–
90 (2010) (citing Subrin’s work).
3
See generally Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
4
Id. at 1856.
5
Id. at 1887–90.
6
Id. at 1875–77; Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a
Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 95 (1997)
[hereinafter Subrin, Uniformity].
7
Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011) (arguing that “[i]f one believes in the underlying values of American democracy” that the disappearance of the civil
jury trial is “deeply troubling”).
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zens gain entry to a unique forum for civic education.8 These benefits disappear
with the trial’s decline, leaving behind an impoverished procedural system.
Prof. Subrin believes that “[c]ivil litigation and democracy should be, and
they can be, mutually reinforcing.”9 If this is so, then procedural designers
should identify ways to resurrect the civil trial. Prof. Subrin has done his part,
suggesting a set of reforms devised to boost the rate at which small-scale private law cases go to trial. I describe and briefly critique his proposal in part I. I
question whether the sort of interventions Prof. Subrin has proposed will send
enough civil cases to trial to achieve the sort of goals he rightfully champions.
Still, Prof. Subrin has made a compelling case that procedural doctrine
should shoulder a democratic agenda, and that the civil trial can further this
agenda well. I thus extend Prof. Subrin’s search for the civil trial’s future and,
with it, the democratic contributions that civil procedure can make to other corners of litigation. At the opposite end of the procedural spectrum from Prof.
Subrin’s small-scale private law affairs are large structural reform lawsuits. I
argue in part III that these cases may be the best place to look for trial and its
benefits going forward. Structural reform trials can facilitate pro-democratic
judicial review, create uniquely important moments of accountability for government officials, and spur political engagement outside the courtroom. These
cases will always remain a small part of the American civil docket, but their
subject matter has such public significance that trials in them can particularly
affect the workings of representative government. Moreover, while the overall
civil trial rate may be hard to budge, a modest change to judicial practice may
produce more trial-type proceedings in structural reform cases. I draw inspiration for these claims from a case study I provide in part II, where the heart of
this article lies. Graves v. Arpaio, a class action challenging conditions in jails
run by Arizona’s notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio, went to trial in August 2008. Its
labyrinthine history illuminates the democratic rewards that trials in structural
reform cases can produce.
Prof. Subrin celebrates the anti-elitist and civic engagement benefits of jury
trials, goods that bench trials in structural reform cases cannot generate. In fact,
these cases often highlight some of the phenomena, including enhanced judicial
power, that Prof. Subrin faults as anti-democratic when they surface in smaller
cases. It may be time, though, to remember the civil trial in modest cases as a
procedural relic of a bygone era. If so, structural reform litigation may prove
the most fertile ground for this distinctive process, and, going forward, structural reform trials may make different but nonetheless important contributions
to American democracy.

8
Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 36 (1994) [hereinafter Subrin,
Fudge Points].
9
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402.
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THE DISAPPEARING CIVIL TRIAL AND PROF. SUBRIN’S RESPONSE

Prof. Subrin believes that our procedural system, if properly designed, can
improve American government by “adding legitimacy and stability to government and society,” “permitting citizens to partake in governance,” “restraining
or enhancing power,” and “enhancing human dignity.”10 Of all the system’s
constituent processes, the civil trial can serve these goals with distinctive success. Its efficacy results chiefly from juror participation. Jury trials temper elite
control of legal processes and offer intense moments for civic education. In
Prof. Subrin’s words, these trials “add legitimacy to our process by engaging a
wider spectrum of the population”; they “counter-balance” the power judges
wield “by providing community input and permitting dialogue between many
citizens”; they educate citizen-jurors “in the values of democracy, law, and
governance”; they introduce citizens to others in their community with whom
they might otherwise lack contact;11 and they give “the citizenry at large” the
power to “decide[] what the community deems acceptable” as “legitimate behavioral norms.”12
If the civil trial can deliver all of these benefits, then its near-disappearance
should cause worry.13 This demise has attracted much comment and only needs
a brief summary here. In 1962, trial verdicts accounted for 11.5 percent of all
civil case dispositions.14 By 1982, this figure had fallen to 6.1 percent.15 As of
the turn of the century, only about 2 percent of civil cases ended with a trial
verdict,16 and the American civil litigator averages under one trial per year.17
Prof. Subrin believes that this demise partly results from litigation inefficiencies fueled by the Federal Rules’ needless procedural burdens and complexity. The Federal Rules do not stop a lawyer from using scorched-earth liti10
Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 140 (1999). The complete list includes the following:

(1) resolving and ending disputes peacefully; (2) efficiency; (3) fulfilling societal norms through
law-application; (4) accurate ascertainment of facts; (5) predictability; (6) enhancing human dignity; (7) adding legitimacy and stability to government and society; (8) permitting citizens to
partake in governance; (9) aiding the growth and improvement of law; (10) restraining or enhancing power.

Id.
11

STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONTEXT 256–57 (2006); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402. For similar
sentiments, see ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 113–33 (2009); Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the Vanishing Trial on America’s Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165 (2006); Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (2003).
12
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402.
13
SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 11, at 240–41.
14
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 (2004).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 463.
17
ABA SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 19 (Dec. 11,
2009).
IN
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gation tactics to bludgeon adversaries into settlements.18 Indeed, the Federal
Rules force even parsimonious lawyers into activity, such as mandatory disclosure, that generates costs but often does little to improve the accuracy of case
outcomes.19 As a result, as Prof. Subrin lamented decades ago, the Federal
Rules have turned “[p]artners, associates, paralegals, secretaries, office managers, experts, photocopying machines, magnetic tapes and computers” into “platoons poised to attack, defend and counterattack.”20 Parties feel compelled to
settle, and judges exert more control in an effort to contain excessive litigation.
This case management, enabled by the “unbridled discretionary power” the
Federal Rules afford judges,21 can “exacerbate the disease” by increasing litigation activity, and thus costs, even further.22 Judges push the parties to settle,23
and they contort dismissal and summary judgment doctrine to expand their
power to dispose of cases before trial.24
For as long as Prof. Subrin has complained of trial-killing tendencies in the
Federal Rules, he has dreamt of a solution.25 Rather than have a single set of
rules apply regardless of case size, a tailored set of procedures should govern
“simple track” cases, a category of mostly common law disputes involving less
than $500,000 in controversy.26 A recent iteration of Prof. Subrin’s proposal
describes the following procedures:
A simple track would set a trial date shortly after commencement that is perhaps
no more than six or nine months from the date the answer is filed. A discovery
cut-off date would be set at the same time. There would be only one required
conference, to set the discovery-cut-off date and the firm trial date, and perhaps
even this could be dispensed with if presumptive time standards were established. There would be limits on discovery for all cases on the simple track.
Whether that would be two or three depositions, each one lasting no more than
three or four hours, and ten or fifteen interrogatories, would be up to the drafters
[of the simple track rules]. The length of time before trials and discovery cut-off
dates should also be left to the drafters, but it is important that once the dates and
limitations are decided upon, they be kept firm, except for very good cause

18

Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 387 (2010) [hereinafter
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure].
19
Id. at 389.
20
Stephen N. Subrin, The Law and the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23.
21
Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 8, at 36.
22
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 389.
23
Subrin, Uniformity, supra note 6, at 94.
24
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 390.
25
“Dreamt” is an apt word. Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 173, 182 (2007) [hereinafter Subrin, Reflections] (describing “simplified procedure” as a “dream”).
26
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 398–400; Burbank
& Subrin, supra note 7, at 409–11. Subrin would exempt cases involving “the private enforcement of public law,” or those brought to vindicate statutory rights of action, from his
proposal. Id. at 411. Hence, the impact would be confined to common law disputes.
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shown. . . . The drafters of the simple track should consider requiring more specificity for document requests than is currently the norm . . . .27

In addition, a notice pleading standard would govern complaints for cases
on the simple track, and the “simple track” rules would exempt parties from initial disclosures requirements.28
As intended, these “simple track” procedures would reduce litigation inefficiencies by restricting discovery and decreasing the work associated with
mandatory pretrial conferences. Focused on the merits by the early trial date,
litigators would eschew tangentially important discovery and marginally useful
motion practice.29 The “simple track” procedures would protect against the
buildup of settlement pressure that litigation inefficiencies produce. Judges
would have less to manage, both because the “simple track” procedures would
require less stewardship, and because the discovery restrictions would minimize conflicts requiring a referee. Freed from having to deal with discovery
disputes and other tedious housekeeping matters, judges would be less tempted
by “trial-aborting procedural devices,” such as summary judgment and Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals.30 Trial would become “an economically realistic option in
substantially more cases.”31 Trials would again enable civil litigation to reinforce democracy.32
Several recurring themes emerge from Prof. Subrin’s evaluation of the jury
trial’s benefits, his diagnosis of what has caused its decline, and his prescription
of simple track procedures as a remedy. Juror empowerment expands civil procedure’s democratic potential. Inefficiency generated by wasteful, unhelpful
litigation has decreased the trial rate and denudes the contributions procedure
can make to representative government. Judicial power, manifested as extensive case management and the enlarged exercise of decisional authority, results
from this inefficiency and exemplifies the anti-democratic turn in the American
procedural system. Significant, but not transformative, rule changes can boost
the rate at which small-scale cases go to trial and thereby help civil procedure
reclaim some of its lost capacity to contribute to American democracy.
If this summary of Prof. Subrin’s work is accurate, then my suggestion that
one look for democratic benefits in structural reform trials might seem to misfire. These cases rarely empower jurors as decisionmakers33 and instead vest

27

Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399.
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 409–11.
29
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399. Cf. Subrin,
Uniformity, supra note 6, at 96 (discussing the utility of an early trial date in producing litigation efficiencies).
30
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 413; see also Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive
Procedure, supra note 18, at 404.
31
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 414.
32
Id.
33
For an example of a judge empaneling an advisory jury in a significant injunctive relief
case, see NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). For a
28
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judicial elites with a sizeable endowment of both decisional authority and managerial discretion. Moreover, structural reform cases are “statistical rarities.”34
Even if all went to trial, the overall civil trial rate would hardly budge.
Nonetheless, for a couple of reasons, a search in big cases for the future of
trial as a pro-democratic process makes sense. First, Prof. Subrin’s proposal, if
implemented, might not work. As Steven Gensler and Judge Lee Rosenthal observe, “[t]he vast majority of cases are going to settle for reasons that are not
tied to how the judge conducts the pretrial process.”35 Empirical data on attorney behavior are consistent with this observation. Most of the time lawyers
keep litigation costs in check, even without rules requiring them to do so, and
judges tend to be excessively absent from civil litigation, not overbearingly
managerial.36 Lowering costs and minimizing judicial involvement through rule
changes, in other words, may not change the civil trial’s status quo. In his most
recent article, a magisterial study and critique of our current procedural era,
Prof. Subrin identifies a range of political and cultural causes of the trial’s demise.37 These forces are more likely culprits for the development Prof. Subrin
regrets, and they probably exceed the capacity of procedural rule changes to
counter. Second, even if Prof. Subrin’s simple track proposal could boost the
civil trial rate, the result would be citizen jurors engaged exclusively with
small-scale, private law matters. Few would ask jurors to decide issues of high
political or policy salience.
Large-scale structural reform cases against government defendants are
small in number compared to the common law disputes Prof. Subrin targets
with his simple track proposal. But a trial in even one of them might promise a
good deal of democratic bang for the litigation buck, albeit of a different sort
than what small jury trials can generate. I argue that this is so in part III.
discussion of the right to a jury trial in injunctive relief cases, see New York v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
34
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
511 (1986).
35
Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849,
867 (2013).
36
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 35, 42, 75 (2009), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; see also Steve
Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 579 (2012) (“There is no evidence that discovery is an unreasonable burden in the vast majority of cases. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: discovery
works well (or is not used at all) in most cases, and where used is commensurate to the
stakes involved.”). Prof. Subrin acknowledges these data. Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 392 (commenting on data that suggest that “lawyers
. . . are effectively sorting cases on a case-size basis, despite the transsubstantive, equity-like
nature of the Rules”); Subrin, Reflections, supra note 25, at 183 (“[I]t looks like lawyers are
by themselves [and/or at the prodding of clients] making intelligent decisions about how
much discovery is appropriate.”).
37
Subrin & Main, supra note 3, at 1856–70. Cf. BURNS, supra note 11, at 88–108 (discussing suggested explanations).
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II. THE CIVIL TRIAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORM: THE MARICOPA COUNTY
JAILS EXAMPLE
My case study of Graves v. Arpaio, provided in this part, lays a foundation
for my claims about American democracy and the structural reform trial. The
case involves a constitutional challenge to the conditions of jails in Maricopa
County, Arizona, institutions run by the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The
plaintiffs, a class of pretrial detainees, established the defendants’ liability after
what amounted to a bench trial in Autumn 2008, but not before nearly a decade
of courtroom fights with an adversary famous for his stubborn refusal to compromise or cooperate. The story unfolds at some length, in part because I believe it is a good one, in part because the case itself has gone on for so long,
and in part because it has a lot of relevant lessons to teach. The case’s history
divides into three phases. The first lasted from 1977 to 1981. The second, a period of gridlock, began in 1998 and continued for ten frustrating years. The
third lasted for only a few months in 2008 before ending in trial. This final
phase demonstrates the efficacy that aggressive case management and trial can
have in the face of recalcitrant political power.
A. The Maricopa County Jails and America’s Toughest Sheriff
1. The Early History of Maricopa Jails Litigation
Graves v. Arpaio began as Hart v. Hill in 1977, when lawyers for the Maricopa County Legal Aid Society filed the initial complaint in the federal District of Arizona.38 Commenced during the heyday of prison reform litigation,39
the case challenged a range of conditions. Among other allegations, the plaintiffs complained that officials running the Maricopa County jails had interfered
with inmate mail, denied them use of telephones, forced them to listen to
lengthy religious broadcasts over the public address system, failed to provide
them access to legal materials, placed them in overcrowded and dirty cells, fed
them inadequate food, and provided them inadequate medical care.40
The case was assigned to Earl Carroll, who certified it as a class action.41
After a couple of years of litigation, the parties agreed to enter into a consent
decree toward the end of 1980.42 Judge Carroll held a fairness hearing in February 1981 and issued a judgment incorporating the parties’ agreement a month

38

Complaint, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 16, 1977).
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 39 (2000).
40
Complaint, supra note 38.
41
Memorandum and Order at 5, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Aug.
1, 1978).
42
Stipulation and Agreement, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 8,
1980).
39

Summer 2015]

CIVIL TRIAL’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

1531

later.43 The consent decree required a litany of changes to improve the lot of
Maricopa County inmates, ranging from limits on inmate populations44 to improvements in food quality45 to better healthcare services.46 Read thirty years
hence, some of the consent decree’s provisions stand out, given how flagrantly
the county would renege upon them in the future. These include, for example,
the county’s agreement “to provide detainees with heating and cooling systems
. . . necessary to provide healthful and comfortable living conditions,”47 and its
agreement “to provide a receiving screening of detainees prior to placement in
the general population” to identify those needing medical care.48
Judge Carroll retained jurisdiction to monitor compliance with the decree.49
The rest of the 1980s witnessed some skirmishing over the county’s compliance and the plaintiffs’ fees.50 By the end of the decade, filings amounted mostly to routine requests to override provisions of the consent decree for short periods of time or reports from the court-ordered monitor.51 In January 1995,
Judge Carroll signed an amended judgment, replacing the 1981 consent decree.
This amended judgment indicated that Judge Carroll would put an end to his
monitoring of jail conditions, although he retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the judgment’s specific terms.52
2. Sheriff Joe and the Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Maricopa County jails litigation took a fateful turn when Joe Arpaio,
“America’s toughest sheriff,” arrived on the scene.53 He first won election to
serve as Maricopa County’s sheriff in 1992, and voters have returned him to
office five times since then.54 Arpaio has aggressively exploited nativist, antibig government resentment to achieve international notoriety.55 He received his
first wave of national attention in 1993 when he erected a “tent city jail” in
43

Judgment, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 1981).
Id. at 3.
45
Id. at 18.
46
Id. at 12–14.
47
Id. at 6.
48
Id. at 4.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Civil Docket at entries 215–374, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.).
51
Id. at entries 453–92.
52
Amended Judgment at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Jan. 9,
1995).
53
JOE ARPAIO & LEN SHERMAN, JOE’S LAW: AMERICA’S TOUGHEST SHERIFF TAKES ON
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, DRUGS, AND EVERYTHING ELSE THAT THREATENS AMERICA (2008).
54
Joe Hagan, The Long, Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2,
2012); Joseph Serna, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Illegal Immigration Hardliner, Reelected, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012.
55
From early in his tenure, Arpaio made no secret of his dogged pursuit of publicity. See,
e.g., Louis Sahagun, A Maverick Lays Down the Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1994, at A1
(quoting Arpaio as criticizing his critics as “jealous” because “I’m getting all the publicity”);
see also Hagan, supra note 54 (describing Arpaio’s love of publicity).
44
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Phoenix, ostensibly to ease prison crowding,56 but also to cause inmates discomfort.57 Temperatures in these tents during the long Phoenix summers have
exceeded 140 degrees.58
Other publicity-grabbing measures soon followed. Arpaio banned erotic
magazines, cigarettes, and coffee;59 he refused to screen anything but G-rated
movies for inmates;60 and, perhaps most notoriously, he required inmates to
wear pink underwear.61 The tone Arpaio set hardly helped improve the conditions covered by the 1981 consent decree.62 A 1996 U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) investigation discovered “routine abuse” of prisoners,63 and, after the
death of an inmate, an Amnesty International report documented at least a dozen instances of the ill-treatment or use of excessive force on inmates.64 In 1997,
a year when an Iceland judge refused to extradite a couple to Maricopa County
on account of the jails’ “barbaric conditions,”65 a federal investigation ended
when Arpaio agreed to end the use of excessive force on inmates.66 In 1999, he
settled a lawsuit brought by the DOJ Civil Rights Division over allegations of
constitutionally inadequate medical care for inmates.67
During the first few years of Arpaio’s tenure, the Maricopa County jails
remained subject to the 1995 amended judgment. On April 8, 1998, however,
56

Paul Leavitt, Weather Went to Extremes in July, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 1993, at 3A.
Groups of five or more adults can schedule a tour of the “internationally famous Tents Jail.”
Prospective tourists are advised that they must wear “business casual” attire.
See MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., Jail Information: Tent City Jail,
http://www.mcso.org/jailinformation/tentcity.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
57
Touting his plan, Arpaio complained that “jails are too much like country clubs.” Leavitt,
supra note 56.
58
Eugene Scott, Temperatures Rise to 145 Inside Tent City, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 3, 2011,
at B4. Asked to comment, Arpaio said, “[w]hat am I going to do, take them out of jail because it’s too hot?” Id.
59
No-Frills Jail Gets Tougher: No More Coffee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at 28.
60
Judi Villa, Sheriff Bans R-Rated Movies for Jail Inmates, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 1993,
3:18 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1993/12/09/19931209joe-arpaio-bansmovies.html.
61
State Plan to Stop Jail Underwear Theft Has Phoenix Sheriff Tickled Pink, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 21, 1995).
62
One little but telling issue: notwithstanding the decree’s requirement that the county feed
inmates adequately, Arpaio fed them green bologna. Sue Anne Pressley, Sheriff’s Specialty:
Making Jail Miserable, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1997, at A01.
63
Is
This
Man
Amusing
Anymore?,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
28,
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/magazine/sunday-july-28-1996-law-enforcement
-is-this-man-amusing-anymore.html.
64
AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ILL-TREATMENT OF INMATES IN MARICOPA
COUNTY JAILS, ARIZONA 2 (1997), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a98520
.html.
65
Pressley, supra note 62.
66
Dennis Wagner & Jerry Kammer, Arpaio Is Happy Jail Probe Is Over, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Nov. 1, 1997, 12:10 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1997/11/01
/19971101joe-arpaio-jail-probe.html.
67
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at Exhibit A, Graves v. Arpaio,
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2006).
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Arpaio moved under the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) to terminate the consent decree.68 The Maricopa County jails litigation had never really ended, since Judge Carroll’s supervision remained ongoing. Hence the District of Arizona clerk’s office sent Arpaio’s 2001 motion to
Judge Carroll and Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver, who had worked with Judge
Carroll during the litigation’s first phase in the 1970s.
Enacted in 1995, the PLRA authorizes a defendant to move to terminate
any “prospective relief” governing prison conditions, including relief obtained
in litigation concluded before the statute’s enactment.69 Lawyers for the inmates challenged this provision of the PLRA as unconstitutional, and Judge
Carroll agreed.70 But the Ninth Circuit reversed, and on September 25, 2001,
Arpaio renewed his motion to terminate.71
This date had enormous significance for the governance of Maricopa
County jails. Although Judge Carroll initially denied the motion without prejudice pending an evidentiary hearing on jail conditions, the September 25, 2001
filing triggered the PLRA’s automatic stay provision. The statute provides that
a motion to terminate “shall operate as a stay” of a prison conditions remedy,
beginning thirty days after filing and ending upon the entry of a final order deciding the motion.72 In other words, although Judge Carroll had yet to decide
whether the Maricopa County jails had improved sufficiently to justify an end
to judicial supervision, the motion’s mere filing freed Arpaio’s jails from decades of federal control. So long as the motion to terminate remained pending,
the plaintiffs could not enforce the amended judgment, regardless of how bad
conditions got.
B. Gridlock
1. The Judiciary
For the next six years, Graves v. Arpaio stalled, and the Maricopa County
jails remained outside judicial supervision. The litigation sputtered along for a
couple of years after 2001, with a smattering of motion practice but no real discovery.73 Judge Carroll heard one day of testimony on November 25, 2003, and

68

Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct.
22, 2008).
69
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (2012); see also Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2000) (extensively discussing the termination provision).
70
Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1.
71
Id.
72
18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2012); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000) (upholding as constitutional the automatic stay provision).
73
None of the docket entries between September 25, 2001, and November 25, 2003, reflects
any discovery. Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1–2
(D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2008).
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another on January 22, 2004.74 The case then ground to a complete halt.75 In
fact, the plaintiffs would complain in 2008 that “virtually nothing . . . [has] occurred” since the January 2004 hearing day.76 (By point of comparison, Judge
Carroll stewarded the first phase of litigation from filing to consent decree in
less than four years.)
Both the judges assigned to the case and the defense counsel bear responsibility for this gridlock. Neither Judge Carroll nor Judge Sitver pushed the case
along with any energy, a lassitude that the defense counsel exploited. By early
2008, seven fully briefed motions awaited decision, including ones on matters
as routine as a request for a status conference. Several of these motions had
been pending for well over a year.77 In a couple of instances, the judges expressed some impatience with the plaintiffs. At one point, Judge Carroll pointedly questioned the plaintiffs’ lawyers over the fees that they would seek if
successful.78 Another episode went more to the case’s merits. On January 24,
2005, an inmate with diabetes named Deborah Ann Braillard died after going
seventy hours without insulin.79 Braillard had a lengthy arrest record, and she
had received insulin during previous jail stints.80 This time, however, shoddy
record-keeping practices kept jail staff in the dark about her diabetes during her
intake.81 Braillard pleaded for help as her health deteriorated, and friends tried
to notify the jail of her condition.82 But officers mistook her distress for symp-

74

Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *2. The hearing testimony came from Arpaio’s witnesses.
See Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at *9–12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2005).
75
On July 29, 2005, for example, plaintiffs listed the following undecided motions, among
others: a motion for court-appointed experts (fully-briefed for eighteen months); a motion to
compel defendants to allow expert inspections (fourteen months); a motion to quash deposition subpoenas (twelve months); a motion to compel the production of documents (twelve
months); and a motion for leave to file declarations of class members (seven months). Pending Motions Notification Pursuant to D. Ariz. L. R. Civ. 7.2(I), Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. July 29, 2005).
76
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Consideration of Motion for Appointment of Class
Counsel and Motion for Expedited Consideration of All Pending Motions, at 2, Graves v.
Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008).
77
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Pending Motions Notification, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2008).
78
Carroll was concerned about the hourly rate at which plaintiffs’ counsel would attempt to
bill Maricopa County. As plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out several times, the court would have
to approve any fees awarded prevailing counsel, and the PLRA caps the hourly rate afforded
prevailing lawyers. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, In-Court Hearing, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at *12–13, 19, 26 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008).
79
Dave Biscobing & Mark LaMet, Key Evidence in Maricopa County Jail Death
15
(Oct.
17,
2012,
Suit
of
Deborah
Braillard
‘Destroyed’,
ABC
8:01 AM), http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/key-evidence-in-mari
copa-county-jail-death-suit-of-deborah-braillard-destroyed.
80
JJ Hensley & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, County Agrees to Settle Suit Tied to Inmate Death,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 2012, at B4.
81
Id.
82
Biscobing & LaMet, supra note 79.
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toms of withdrawal.83 At one point, they moved her to a television room so that
she would not disturb sleeping inmates, then later dumped her unconscious
body on her bunk.84
For obvious reasons, class counsel wanted to talk to Braillard’s cellmates,
who had witnessed the events leading to her death. Arpaio refused to allow the
interviews, so the plaintiffs asked Judge Sitver to intervene. Although he ultimately granted the motion to compel access, he did so with apparent reluctance.
“The Court is well aware that continued attempts to seek the Court’s intervention with respect to events occurring at the Maricopa County Jail . . . would not
necessarily serve the interests of either the pretrial detainees or Defendants,”
Judge Sitver wrote in February 2005. “Not every serious incident necessarily
suggests a violation of constitutional rights . . . .”85
2. The Defense Counsel
The defense counsel stood to gain from delay, particularly because the
PLRA required the consent decree’s suspension during the lawsuit’s pendency.
From start to finish, Michele Iafrate, an erstwhile Maricopa County prosecutor
with experience defending Arpaio’s office and other government units in abuse
of power cases,86 represented the sheriff.87 Dennis Wilenchik joined Iafrate in
October 2005, formally as counsel for the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (BOS), but effectively as another representative for Arpaio. The story of
how he entered the case ultimately relates to some of the democratic benefits
that trial in structural reform cases can create.
The Maricopa County Attorney represents the BOS and determines whom
to hire as outside counsel.88 In January 2005, Andrew Thomas, an Arpaio con-

83

Hensley & Ye Hee Lee, supra note 80.
Id. In November 2012, Maricopa County agreed to pay $3.25 million to settle the
Braillard case, after seven years of litigation. Biscobing & LaMet, supra note 79. Arpaio’s
office destroyed a number of pieces of key evidence that would otherwise have tended to
demonstrate gross indifference to her health. Id.
85
Order, at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2005).
86
See IAFRATE & ASSOCS., Michele M. Iafrate, http://www.iafratelaw.com/staff/attorneys
/michele-m-iafrate (last visited Apr. 23, 2015); IAFRATE & ASSOCS., Representative Clients,
http://iafratelaw.com/representative-clients/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (listing seven government units as “representative clients”). For representative cases, see Stoddard v. Donahoe, 228 P.3d 144, 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Trombi v. Donahoe, 222 P.3d 284, 286
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Greenwood v. State, 175 P.3d 687, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
87
See Michele M. Iafrate, supra note 86.
88
Bd. of Supervisors of Maricopa Cnty. v. Woodall, 586 P.2d 628, 632 (Ariz. 1978) (en
banc). This power is actually contested and has been the subject of significant dispute. Opinion and Order Imposing Sanctions, In re Members of the State Bar of Ariz., Andrew Thomas
et al., PDJ-2011-9002, at 32–38 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter “Thomas Disciplinary
Opinion”],
available
at
http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/9/Press%20Releases/2012
/041012ThomasAubuchonAlexander_opinion.pdf.
84
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fidante,89 began his tenure as county attorney.90 Thomas had worked the previous nine months as an associate at Wilenchik’s firm,91 a stint of employment
the Ninth Circuit would later describe as “a disguised campaign contribution to
Thomas.”92 Upon assuming office, Thomas frequently replaced government
lawyers with outside counsel on civil cases.93 By October 2007, he had steered
$1.8 million worth of this work to Wilenchik, his former employer.94 These
matters included, for example, Thomas’s criminal investigation of Terry Goddard, who had beaten Thomas in 2002 to win election as Arizona’s Attorney
General.95 Wilenchik won Arpaio’s favor, and at one point Arpaio’s deputy requested that Wilenchik represent the sheriff in all civil matters.96

89

Paul Rubin, Dangerous Mind, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004,
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2004-08-26/news/dangerous-mind/ (quoting Andrew
Thomas as saying that “I have a good relationship with Joe”); Michael Kiefer & JJ Hensley,
Criticism Mounting vs. Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Andrew Thomas, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/12/22/20091222joe-arpaio-criti
cism-mounting.html. Ultimately Andrew Thomas was disbarred as a result of some of his
actions taken on Arpaio’s behalf. Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra note 88, at 232. The
ethics opinion requiring this sanction said the following about Thomas’s relationship with
Arpaio:
[I]t was [Thomas and a colleague] who encouraged any untoward actions with a resolute refusal
to act independently of the Sheriff. With either a wink and a nod or a collaborative voice they
supported actions that became increasingly questionable, rather than independently following
their seemingly never-assumed role as arbiters of justice. If the mighty forces of the offices of
the Sheriff and the County Attorney in Maricopa County were adrift, they were intentionally
loosed from their principled moorings by the guided hand of a Respondent with an intellect
fueled with ferocity, an irrational ego and a concomitant endless ability to feed their actions with
rumors and speculations.

Id. at 21.
90
John Dougherty, Doubting Thomas, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, June 13, 2006,
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2006-06-08/news/doubting-thomas/.
91
Id.
92
Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 909 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
93
Head to Head: County Attorney’s Race, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 11, 2008, 10:39
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2008/09/11/20080911
elex-ctyattyheadtohead.html.
94
Sending Friend to Combat Foes: Thomas Funnels High-Profile Cases to Former Employer, E. VALLEY TRIB., Oct. 23, 2007; see Dennis Welch, Thomas Uses Private Lawyers on
VALLEY
TRIB.
(Oct.
21,
2011,
7:52
PM),
Opponents,
E.
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/article_4154bd07-accf-570b-ade3-0dc550aac1ee.html;
see also Lacey, 693 F.3d at 941 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part).
95
Welch, supra note 94.
96
Paul Rubin, Below the Belt, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007),
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-09-20/news/below-the-belt/ (reporting the contents
of a letter from Arpaio’s top deputy to Thomas, in which the deputy requests that Thomas
hire Wilenchik to represent the sheriff’s office in all civil matters); see also John Dougherty,
Bully Pulpit, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (June 29, 2006), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com
/2006-06-29/news/bully-pulpit/ (discussing the same letter).
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Wilenchik has won attention for aggressive litigation tactics deployed in a
couple of instances.97 An example involves a proceeding against the Phoenix
New Times, an alternative weekly and long-time Arpaio adversary. (The events
eventually generated a civil suit filed by the newspaper’s editors, and the following story is based on allegations in the complaint and not facts proven at trial.98) The newspaper published Arpaio’s home address on its website in 2004,
in connection with a story about alleged corruption in the sheriff’s office.99 Arpaio pressured Thomas to prosecute the newspaper, invoking an obscure Arizona statute that prohibits the electronic dissemination of a law officer’s personal information.100 Eventually Thomas hired Wilenchik, along with a couple
of other attorneys, to handle the matter as a special prosecutor.101 In October
2007, Wilenchik served several grand jury subpoenas on the New Times, requesting, among other information, the names of all confidential sources used
for stories about Arpaio and information about visitors to any story published
on the newspaper’s website since 2004.102 The newspaper promptly published
the subpoenas in an article entitled Breathtaking Abuse of the Constitution.103
Wilenchik responded with a motion for criminal contempt, then had several of
Arpaio’s men arrest the newspapers’ co-editors before the presiding judge
could rule. The judge would soon quash the procedurally invalid subpoenas.104
The editors sued, and, six years later, they settled their lawsuit against Arpaio,
Wilenchik, and others for $3.75 million.105
Public outcry forced Wilenchik off the Phoenix New Times matter, but otherwise he continued to handle work on behalf of Maricopa County.106 Thomas
has since met with a less desirable fate. He turned a disagreement with a couple
of Maricopa County supervisors107 over outside counsel referral authority into a
97
Another illustration, in addition to what I discuss in this paragraph, is Wilenchik’s representation of Arpaio in a defamation suit brought against Arpaio by one of his political opponents. See Dougherty, supra note 96.
98
Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 907–09.
101
Thomas recused his office from the investigation on conflict of interest grounds. He was
also a frequent target of Phoenix New Times muckraking. Id. at 909.
102
Id.
103
Michael Lacey & Jim Larkin, Breathtaking Abuse of the Constitution, PHOENIX NEW
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-10-18/news/breathtaking-a
buse-of-the-constitution/full/.
104
Lacey, 693 F.3d at 910.
105
Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Michael Kiefer, Maricopa County Supervisors Settle Lawsuits
Filed by ‘New Times’ Founders, Stapley, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2013,
4:08 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131218maricopa-county-super
visors-settle-lawsuit-new-times-founders.html.
106
Robert Anglen, Thomas Fires Prosecutor, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 20, 2007, 1:15
PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2007/10/20/20071020joe-arpaio-new-times
-case-dropped.html.
107
The story leading to Andrew Thomas’s disbarment is a complicated one. As far as I can
tell, the conflict between him and the Board of Supervisors began when he and one of the
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bizarre vendetta against his political opponents.108 Among other misdeeds,
Thomas indicted a supervisor on spurious bribery charges;109 filed a frivolous
civil suit under the federal RICO statute, with himself and Joe Arpaio as plaintiffs, against a number of government officials, including four Arizona Superior
Court judges;110 and then indicted a judge on fabricated bribery charges after
the judge ruled against him and Arpaio several times.111 This misguided crusade ended with Thomas’s disbarment and, as of December 2013, more than
$17 million paid to settle civil cases brought by those wrongfully targeted.112
3. A Strategy of Delay in Graves v. Arpaio
Although not as newsworthy, the strategy of delay that Arpaio’s lawyers
appear to have employed in Graves v. Arpaio was similarly aggressive. They
repeatedly refused to engage in discovery,113 even ignoring the rare order issued by Judge Carroll to cooperate.114 Filings proliferated, including those on
picayune matters. After receiving a several-month extension to respond to a

supervisors had a disagreement about referral authority. Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra
note 88, at 33–34.
108
For much of the story, see Terry Carter, The Prosecutor on Trial: Ex-Maricopa County
Attorney Faces Disbarment for Political Acts, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2012,
11:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_prosecutor_on_trial_ex-mari
copa_co._atty_faces_disbarment_for_political/.
109
Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra note 88, at 67–68.
110
Id. at 106.
111
Id. at 142. Of the more than 1,000 licensed process servers in Maricopa County, Thomas
chose a man who had been convicted years before of threatening the judge with bodily harm
to serve him. Sarah Fenske, Joe Arpaio, Andrew Thomas and the Hunt for Gary Donahoe,
PHOENIX NEW TIMES (June 3, 2010), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2010-06-03
/news/the-hunt-for-gary-donahoe/.
112
Ye Hee Lee & Kiefer, supra note 105.
113
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 2, Graves v. Arpaio,
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2006) (describing defendants’ “blanket” refusal
to provide documents in response to a discovery request); Defendants’ Maricopa County
Board of Supervisor’s [sic] Objections to 9/30/05 Report and Recommendation and Motion
for Protective Order and Request to Set Hearing/Oral Argument on Motion to Terminate at
2–3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2005) (objecting to order
requiring defendants to produce various documents relating to inmate healthcare); Defendants’ Motion for Emergency Hearing and Motion to Stay the September 30, 2005 Order and
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Magistrate Judge’s September 30, 2005 Order,
No. 77-479, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2005) (same);
Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May
30, 2006) (moving to compel the defendants to participate in certain discovery and describing some of their discovery intransigence). To be fair to Arpaio, Judge Sitver left things in a
confused state when he denied some of the plaintiffs’ discovery motions without prejudice
and asked them to refile their motions together. Id. at 11–14.
114
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions for Defendants’ Failure to Comply With Discovery Order at 1, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2006).
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discovery motion,115 for example, Arpaio’s lawyers opposed the plaintiffs’ request for several extra days to file a reply.116 More significantly, Arpaio’s lawyers doggedly resisted when the appointed class counsel invited Margaret Winter of the ACLU, one of the country’s premier prison conditions lawyers, and
Osborn Maledon, a highly respected Arizona law firm, to join him on the plaintiffs’ side.117 Defense counsel’s objection generated ten filings,118 and for nearly two years the plaintiffs’ legal representation remained uncertain.119
Judge Carroll abetted this gridlock-inducing strategy by simply not deciding motions.120 The plaintiffs’ frustration was evident. “Defendants continue to
do everything in their power to conceal evidence of current conditions at the
Maricopa County Jail,” the plaintiffs bemoaned in December 2006.121
Evidence of problems for inmates accumulated as the jails continued to operate without federal judicial supervision due to the PLRA’s automatic stay
provision. A corrections consultant hired by Maricopa County concluded in a
2003 audit of the jails that prison healthcare failed to meet constitutional minima, and that the jails violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.122 From 2003 to 2007, Arpaio refused to file proof that his
115

Defendants’ Motion for Clarification and/or for an Extension of Time in Which to Respond to Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.
June 1, 2006).
116
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Their Reply in
Support of Their Omnibus Motion, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.
Sept. 15, 2006).
117
Basically, Arpaio argued that the court had to appoint class counsel under Rule 23, and
that the ACLU and the law firm could not sua sponte begin representing the class. Defendants’ Objection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by the Osborn Maledon Law Firm
at 3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 1, 2006); Defendants’ Objection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by Margaret Winter, Graves v. Arpaio,
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2007). He did not argue that either set of lawyers was not competent to handle duties as class counsel. After Judge Carroll formally appointed the new lawyers (and thereby corrected the alleged error), Arpaio continued to object, but on grounds that the appointment was not necessary given the complexity of the
lawsuit. Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider Order Appointing Debra Hill and Margaret Winter as Class Counsel, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 08, 2008).
118
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.) (Civil Docket at entries 1146,
1152, 1156, 1197, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1212, 1231).
119
Judge Wake finally put an end to the opposition on April 17, 2008. Graves v. Arpaio,
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at 1–2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2008). Arpaio had filed his first objection on June 1, 2006. Defendants’ Objection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by
the Osborn Maledon Law Firm, supra note 117.
120
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Third Pending Motions Notification at 1–2, Graves v. Arpaio, No.
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. July 30, 2007) (documenting seven fully-briefed motions that
had been pending for more than 180 days).
121
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of: (1) Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply With
Discovery Order and (2) Motion to Compel Supplemental Responses to First Request for
Production of Documents, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 19,
2006).
122
See John Dickerson, Inhumanity Has a Price, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-12-20/news/inhumanity-has-a-price/.
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jails met national standards for adequate conditions with the Arizona Department of Health Services, disobeying a state law that required otherwise.123
Guards killed an inmate with mental disabilities in 2003; an incident that Arpaio tried to cover up by destroying evidence.124 In 2005, a pregnant prisoner
received no medical care for days after another inmate attacked her. She lost
her baby and nearly bled to death.125 That year, a Maricopa County superior
court commissioner described the conditions faced by mentally ill inmates, up
to 20 percent of the pretrial inmate population,126 in the following way: “Severe
overcrowding, unsanitary conditions . . . and bullying by professional criminals, including assaults, extortion and stealing medications, are typical of the
conditions under which the mentally ill live.”127 After trying for four years to
make changes, a nationally recognized expert in prison healthcare hired by the
county resigned in 2008, experiencing a “crisis of conscience” and worrying
that he would lose his medical license over jail conditions.128
The plaintiffs grew desperate. In January 2007, they requested that Judge
Carroll designate another magistrate judge to handle discovery matters.129 Arpaio’s lawyers objected, arguing with some chutzpah that the “appoint[ment of]
a new Judge to rule on certain matters may have the effect of delaying this
case.”130 The plaintiffs’ Hail Mary came a year later. Noting that Arpaio had
produced almost no discovery since January 2004, and listing the many pending motions, the plaintiffs moved to have the case transferred to Susan Bolton,
a district judge who had just been assigned to an individual action challenging
jail conditions.131 The request had no chance of succeeding. Judge Bolton’s
123

John Dickerson, Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s Jails Lose National Accreditation, PHOENIX NEW
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2008-10-09/news/sheriff-joe
-arpaio-s-jails-lose-national-accreditation/.
124
Melissa Gonzalo, Local Attorney Speaking Out Against Sheriff Arpaio, AZCENTRAL
(Apr. 14, 2008, 6:30 PM) http://www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/2008/04/14
/20080414mcsoallegations04142008-CR.html.
125
John Dickerson, Arpaio’s Jail Staff Cost Ambrett Spencer Her Baby, and She’s Not the
Only One, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com
/2008-10-30/news/arpaio-s-jail-staff-cost-ambrett-spencer-her-baby-and-she-s-not-the-onlyone/full/.
126
Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *25 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 22, 2008).
127
Christina Leonard, Detaining Mentally Ill in Jail a Problem, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 17,
2005, 12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/health/news/articles/0317mentallyill.html.
128
Dave Biscobing & Mark LaMet, MCSO Jail Deaths, Lawsuits Considered ‘Cost
15
ARIZONA
(Sept.
12,
2012,
8:54
of
Doing
Business’,
ABC
PM), http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/mcso-jail-deaths-lawsuits-con
sidered-cost-of-doing-business.
129
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Refer Discovery Matters to Magistrate Judge, Graves v. Arpaio, No.
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2007).
130
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Refer Matters to Magistrate Judge, Graves
v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2007).
131
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate Cases and Motion to Reassign Case, Graves v. Arpaio,
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008).
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lawsuit involved a pro se inmate plaintiff with an improperly filed complaint—
a case, in other words, wholly dwarfed by Graves v. Arpaio. She denied the
motion in short order.132
C. Trial Through Case Management
Everything changed on April 3, 2008. Without warning or explanation,
Judge Carroll issued a one-sentence order “recus[ing] himself from further participation in” Graves v. Arpaio. A week later, the District of Arizona’s clerk’s
office reassigned the case to Neil Wake.133 Judge Wake speedily untangled the
farrago of filings. In six months, he presided over a tightly compressed discovery period, held a bench trial, and issued an eighty-page order deciding the decade-old motion.
A week after receiving the case, Judge Wake put a quick end to the longfestering dispute over the ACLU’s and Osborn Maledon’s role as plaintiffs’
counsel.134 On April 24, he issued an extraordinary order, deciding all of the
many pending motions in the case (except Arpaio’s motion to terminate) in one
fell swoop.135 The order also clarified exactly what conditions Arpaio’s motion
to terminate put at issue, a question of obvious importance but one that had
gone unanswered for seven years. The PLRA provides that “[p]rospective relief
shall not terminate if . . . prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right . . . .”136 The Ninth Circuit interpreted this language in 2000 to make “evidence on the current circumstances at
the prison” essential to the disposition of a motion to terminate.137 Nonetheless,
Arpaio’s lawyers had refused to respond to discovery requests, reasoning that
their motion to terminate put only jail conditions on September 25, 2001, the
moment of the motion’s renewal, at issue. All of the plaintiffs’ efforts to gather
information about jail conditions since 2001, they insisted, were “meaningless
and irrelevant.”138 Judge Wake rejected this implausible argument and kickstarted the long-dormant discovery on current jail conditions.139
Most important, however, was the schedule Judge Wake set in his April 24
order. Nothing but fruitless motion practice had proceeded since January
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Hart v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 77-479; Popoca v. Arpaio, No. 07-2250 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 9, 2008).
133
Minute Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2008).
134
Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2008).
135
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008).
136
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (2012).
137
Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000).
138
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 5,
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 2006).
139
Order at 7, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008).
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2004.140 Trying to get the case going, the plaintiffs asked that Judge Wake set a
six-month discovery period, followed by a final evidentiary hearing on the motion to terminate. Not fast enough, Judge Wake decided. “The PLRA plainly
conveys congressional intent that termination of prospective relief regarding
prison conditions be decided swiftly,” he noted. Hence the evidentiary hearing—for all intents and purposes, the trial—would begin in less than four
months, on August 12, 2008.141 Wilenchik immediately moved for a continuance,142 but Judge Wake refused. “The grave urgency of this proceeding requires that all counsel take all efforts to meet the August 12, 2008 final hearing
date,” he insisted, “as the dictates of Congress and the needs of justice in this
case will not allow any delay.”143
Judge Wake repeatedly reiterated his determination that the trial begin as
planned. In an order setting a two-month discovery schedule that the early trial
date necessitated, he declared that “[t]he deadlines established by this Order are
real. ‘Best efforts’ alone will not constitute compliance.”144 Wilenchik resisted
the trial plan. “I don’t mean to be disrespectful in any way,” he said at a May
19, 2008, status conference, “but when you say we can’t wait, I guess my reaction to that would be, we have waited [thirty] years.”145 “I’m not waiting [thirty] years,” Judge Wake responded. “I’m not waiting four years. I’m not waiting
four months.”146 Arpaio’s lawyers would have to tell their client that “this is the
most important lawsuit” he has, the judge insisted, and that Arpaio’s people
must do everything in their power to comply with authorized discovery.147
“Whatever has happened in the past,” Judge Wake declared,
I want diligent, prompt, and good faith production of this information. I don’t
want—and I’m not making any comment or assertion or accusation by anybody.
But I don’t want foot dragging. I don’t want combativeness. I want diligence and
good faith exactly what Rule 1 and Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure require to get this information readily available and produced . . . .148

140

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate and Motion to Transfer Consolidated Cases at 2–3,
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008).
141
Order at 9, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008).
142
Defendant’s Motion to Continue, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.
Apr. 30, 2008).
143
Order at 1–2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 1, 2008).
144
Order at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 29, 2008); see
also Case Management Order at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.
June 6, 2008) (stating “These Deadlines are Real,” and “The parties are warned that failure
to meet any of the deadlines in this order or in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without
substantial justification may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the action or entry of
default.”).
145
Transcript, Scheduling Conference at 22, at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479NVW (D. Ariz., May 19, 2008); see also id. at 5 (“I know sometimes the Court, with all due
respect, gets involved in this quickly. It’s sitting there for 30 years, et cetera.”).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 39.
148
Id. at 70.
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After all, the judge continued, “the sheriff and the county have very large
budgets for legal fees.”149
The delaying tactics that Arpaio’s lawyers had previously employed
stopped working, as an example illustrates. The plaintiffs wanted their psychiatric expert to interview a number of inmates during a tour of a jail. Arpaio’s
lawyers objected, the parties took the matter to Judge Wake, and he granted the
interview request.150 The interviews were scheduled for a Monday. The preceding Thursday afternoon—more than three weeks after the judge issued his order
but only a single weekday before the interviews were supposed to begin—
Iafrate informed the plaintiffs that Arpaio would not permit the interviews. By
her recollection, she insisted, Judge Wake had actually denied the plaintiffs’
request.151 The plaintiffs moved to compel on Friday, taking the sort of action
they had attempted to no effect previously.152 But Judge Wake ruled within
hours, ordering before the weekend began that the interviews would proceed as
planned on Monday.153
A second episode also shows how Judge Wake’s case management practices thwarted attempts to slow-walk the litigation. In June 2008, the parties
clashed over the plaintiffs’ request to have two groups tour a jail simultaneously. The tours were supposed to begin on a Monday. At a hearing the preceding
Thursday, Arpaio’s lawyer insisted that his client lacked sufficient lead-time to
find personnel to act as tour guides.154 Judge Wake responded with a keen understanding of how delay served Arpaio’s interests:
[F]irst of all, we have to remember the context of this motion and this case. This
was your client’s motion filed 10 years ago, and it is, I believe, the oldest lawsuit, other than a few water cases, in the District of Arizona. This motion, which
is 10 years old, is probably the oldest pending motion in this court.
The matter is one of great importance to both sides. It is of great importance
to the County and the sheriff to have it determine whether this injunction that
they agreed to continues in effect. It’s of great importance to the plaintiff class to
have the speedy determination of their motion, which, by statute, was supposed
to have been decided 10 years ago.
The result of the failure to decide this motion has been that the plaintiff
class has been deprived of its stipulated injunction by virtue of the automatic
stay in the PLRA. In effect, the defendants have gotten their relief without their
motion having been found to be meritorious, and the plaintiffs have lost the benefit of the injunction which they accepted in lieu of further adjudication.
149

Id. at 91.
Id. at 116, 120.
151
The argument on the issue at the status conference consumes fifteen transcript pages. Id.
at 105–20. Moreover, Judge Wake actually ruled twice for the plaintiffs, once after Iafrate
argued against the request and again after Wilenchik did the same. Id. at 105, 120.
152
Plaintiffs’ Statement Regarding Discovery Dispute, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 6, 2008).
153
Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 6, 2008).
154
Telephonic Discovery Dispute, Transcript at 4–5, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479NVW (D. Ariz. June 19, 2008).
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Now, I just give this brief summary, not to suggest how this case should go.
I have no idea who will or ought to win this motion. But this is litigation of the
utmost importance to all the parties and to the public. . . . And no matter how
you analyze it, it appears to me that in light of all the resources available to the
County and to the sheriff, and of all the emergencies that they have to deal with
as a routine part of doing business, I can’t see any difficulty or any justification
for not directing the sheriff and the County to provide whatever security or
guides they think appropriate according to their standards and doing it even on
four days notice . . . .
So for these reasons, I find it not at all difficult to conclude that the County
and the sheriff should be ordered, and I will order them, to provide the security
they otherwise think appropriate for whether you call it two or three separate
groups.
And in so concluding, it appears to me, in fact, I have no difficulty concluding that any inconvenience to the County would be utterly trivial compared to
the disruption to the case preparation, the discovery preparation, the needs of the
litigants, and the needs of the Court to bring this long-delayed proceeding to a
conclusion.155

“My order is unqualified,” Judge Wake declared as he ended the hearing.156
Judge Wake kept the parties to his schedule, and they completed extensive
discovery in a very short period of time.157 The trial began on August 12, 2008,
as planned, and proceeded for thirteen days.158 Shortly after it ended, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”), a non-profit entity that reviews healthcare services for inmates, terminated its accreditation of
the Maricopa County jails based on evidence introduced at trial.159 This development dealt a blow to Arpaio, whose lawyers had stressed the NCCHC’s accreditation to support the motion to terminate.160
On October 22, 2008—ten-and-a-half years after Arpaio first filed his motion to terminate, but only six months and twelve days after Judge Wake got the
case—the judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He concluded that some aspects of the amended judgment deserved termination, but also
that the Maricopa County jails remained constitutionally deficient in a signifi155

Id. at 6–9.
Id. at 12.
157
Between June 26, 2008, and July 30, 2008, for example, the parties noticed 54 depositions. Civil Docket at entries 1321–437, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D.
Ariz.).
158
Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct.
22, 2008).
159
Board Defendants’ Notice of Filing and Serving Affidavit of Betty J. Davis, Director,
Correctional Health Services, Maricopa County, Arizona at Exhibit A, Graves v. Arpaio, No.
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (attaching letter from NCCHC advising Arpaio that it was terminating its accreditation based in part on “trial testimony”).
160
Arpaio’s post-trial brief mentions the NCCHC’s accreditation in the first paragraph of a
section entitled “Evidence of Care.” Board Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief at 17, Graves v.
Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2008); see also Dickerson, supra note
123 (describing the stress placed on the accreditation and trial and the reasons for its withdrawal).
156
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cant number of respects. He identified the following problems, among many
others:
x
x
x

x
x
x

x

At one jail, pretrial inmates in segregated housing were locked into
10.5 by 4.3 foot cells, three inmates per cell, for twenty-two to twentythree hours each day.161
Inmates spent up to eight hours in court-holding cells that lacked sufficient “soap and toilet paper to maintain basic elements of hygiene and
sanitation.”162
Intake cells, in which violent repeat offenders were indiscriminately
mixed with DUI or criminal speeding arrestees, were “at times” so
crowded that inmates could not sit down, even on the floor.163 Twentyfour percent of inmates spent more than twenty-four hours in these
cells upon arrest.164
Officers often failed to clean cells or provide inmates with adequate
opportunities to do so themselves.165
Pretrial inmates were insufficiently screened for chronic health problems or mental illness, did not receive medications in a timely fashion,
and were “frequently . . . denied” access to healthcare.166
The Maricopa County jails’ dietician’s opinion that inmates received
adequate nutrition was “unworthy of belief.”167 Some of the food inmates received was inedible,168 and inmates lacked sufficient daily caloric intake.
Corrections officers failed to monitor inmates sufficiently and did not
maintain adequate security.169

In 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all aspects of Judge Wake’s decision.170
As is invariably so with structural reform litigation,171 the story of Graves
v. Arpaio did not end with the close of trial. The remedy phase, which began
with the parties negotiating over proposed steps for reform,172 remains ongoing.
After receiving several reports from monitors assessing his judgment’s implementation, Judge Wake expressed frustration in April 2010 with Arpaio’s failure to comply fully and especially that “improvements appearing to be most
critically needed . . . appear to have been disregarded or postponed to avoid expense.”173 In some respects, however, the jails have clearly improved. By May
161

Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *15.
Id. at *21.
163
Id. at *17.
164
Id. at *37.
165
Id. at *22.
166
Id. at *27–29.
167
Id. at *45.
168
Id.
169
Id. at *48.
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Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979).
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See e.g., Joint Status Report With Respect to Medical and Mental Health Issues, Graves
v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D, Ariz. Dec. 2, 2008).
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Order at 3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2010).
162

1546

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1523

2012, lawyers for the plaintiffs agreed that Arpaio had remedied all of the nonmedical problems that Judge Wake had identified.174 Although some signs
point in the right direction,175 the provision of adequate healthcare remains an
ongoing concern.176
III. THE ROLE OF TRIAL IN STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION
Graves v. Arpaio required intensive case management by a federal judge at
the apogee of his powers. Judge Wake had sole responsibility for decisionmaking, no layperson participated in the establishment of minimal standards for
prison governance, and the trial did not provide civic education to citizenjurors. Graves v. Arpaio is also an extraordinary case, hardly the sort of matter
that could generate a large number of trials going forward. In other words, the
case is the opposite of what Prof. Subrin targets with his simple-track proposal.
But trials in big cases like Graves make important contributions to American democracy. An appreciation of these benefits requires that one rethink
some of Prof. Subrin’s premises—that juror participation is key to procedure’s
democratic potential and that judicial power denudes the contributions procedure can make to representative government. Litigation inefficiencies might
force settlement in small-scale cases, but in structural reform lawsuits they can
preclude resolution on the merits. Coupled with aggressive case management,
trial can respond and thereby act as a procedural facilitator for a type of litigation that addresses shortcomings in representative government. Trial also provides a unique moment of public accountability for various government officials and, because of some cases’ high political salience, a vehicle for political
mobilization. Finally, these benefits might be realizable more readily than the
sort that trial in small-scale cases might provide. A change to judicial practice
can readily generate more trial-type proceedings in structural reform cases.
What follows are a series of hypotheses, inspired by Graves v. Arpaio,
about the function and value of trial in structural reform lawsuits. Although
scholars have subjected this litigation to relentless scrutiny, little is known
about the actual procedural dynamics of public law litigation or the incentives

174

Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Arpaio’s Motion to Terminate, Graves v. Arpaio, No.
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 16, 2012).
175
In 2011, the NCCHC conditionally restored the jails’ accreditation. Michelle Ye Hee
Lee, Maricopa County Jails Receive Conditional Accreditation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 14,
2011, 9:44 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/12/14/20111214maricopa
-county-jails-receive-conditional-accreditation.html. In March 2012, Maricopa County
agreed to implement an electronic medical records system. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Medical
Records in Maricopa County Jails to Go Electronic, REPUBLIC (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:35
PM), http://archive.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/20120314medical-records-maricopa
-county-jails-go-electronic.html. Poor record-keeping had been a major cause of a number of
problems, including Deborah Braillard’s death.
176
Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325–27 (D. Ariz. 2014).
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motivating the participants in it.177 Part II’s case study of Graves v. Arpaio is
fundamentally limited as a data source, but perhaps it suggests lessons that can
inform an empirical research agenda going forward.
A. Trial’s Relationship to Case Management in Structural Reform Litigation
The democratic benefits that structural reform trials can produce flow in
part from the functional utility of the process. Prof. Subrin faults aggressive
case management in ordinary civil cases as a trial-killing phenomenon. If
Graves v. Arpaio is representative, judicial power and trial enjoy a more symbiotic relationship in structural reform litigation. Trial, abetted by aggressive
case management, responds elegantly to problems arising from the incentives
that government officials and their lawyers may have to delay and obstruct.
1. Delay and Obstruction as an Optimal Strategy
Two types of inefficiencies in structural reform cases retard the resolution
of cases on the merits, rather than force settlement. These inefficiencies produce delay and obstruction as the defendant’s preferred litigation strategy. The
first has to do with informational difficulties. The parties may want to settle,
but they cannot predict possible trial outcomes and thus cannot agree to settlement terms. Recurring conditions in structural reform cases particularly thwart
such prognostication, described by legal economists as essential to settlement.178 As Judge Wake did in Graves, judges often bifurcate structural reform
litigation into liability and remedy phases. The latter often last for a long
time179—seven years and counting for Graves. Remedial phases often proceed
as an exercise in dialogue and negotiation, not adversarial adjudication, as
Graves has.180 The remedy depends not on some actuarial calculation of an injury’s monetary worth, but upon the exercise of ample judicial discretion.181
177

Notable exceptions include Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A
Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006), and Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
178
On the relationship between trial predictions and settlement, see, e.g., John H. Langbein,
The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 564 (2012); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 417–18 (1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984).
179
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 873–74 (1999) (“[S]tructural reform litigation takes place in a kind of slow motion, as
rights and remedies are redefined in an iterated process that often stretches out over a number of years in an effort to achieve concrete changes in public institutions.”).
180
Sabel & Simon, supra note 177, at 1055; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT 151 (1983); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365 (1991).
181
John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1128–34 (1996).
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A principal-agent problem creates the second inefficiency. The government
official calling the shots for the defendant agency might have an incentive to
prolong litigation, even if settlement better serves the interests of the agency
and the taxpayers paying for its defense. More litigation means more fees to
distribute to outside counsel and thus to potential campaign donors. When Andrew Thomas ran for reelection, for example, he received three-fourths of all
contributions law firms handling Maricopa County work made to candidates for
the county attorney position.182 Private litigants have an incentive to monitor
wasteful litigation, since they will internalize the costs of excess by paying
more in fees. When attorneys’ fees come from the public treasury, however, the
costs are too diffuse to prompt such monitoring. An opponent might try to
make political hay of these wasteful fees, but, if Maricopa County is any example, they may have little resonance in elections marred by low voter turnout.
Thomas tripled outside counsel fees during his first term as county attorney, for
example,183 yet he easily won reelection.
Also, a government official who settles a high-profile case may pay a political price if the small number of motivated, ideological constituents who vote
in minor elections interpret the deal as a sop to politically-disadvantaged
groups.184 In fact, officials may believe they can curry political favor from such
constituencies by refusing to compromise. Arpaio’s resistance to settlement
overtures in a racial profiling case the DOJ brought against him suggests this
sort of motive.185 “I am the constitutionally and legitimately elected sheriff and
I absolutely refuse to surrender my responsibility to the federal government,”
Arpaio fulminated. “[T]o the Obama administration, who is attempting to
strong arm me into submission only for its political gain[,]” Arpaio continued,
“I say, ‘This will not happen, not on my watch!’ ”186

182

Yvonne Wingett & Grayson Steinberg, Cash Pours In, Raising Stakes for County Attorney Race, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com
/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/08/14/20080814bigmoney0814.html. Control over the
funds used to pay these fees was important enough in Maricopa County to start the series of
missteps that led to Thomas’s disbarment. Other government officials might balk at wasted
litigation costs and try to impose some discipline. See e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 177,
at 1092. But recourse short of legal action against the profligate official might be limited.
Only after Thomas’s fall from political grace did other officials within Maricopa County
begin to discipline expenditures on private lawyers. Private Counsel Fees Are Capped, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, May 14, 2010.
183
Private Counsel Fees Are Capped, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 14, 2010.
184
For a more nuanced description of the incentives and pressures a government official
feels, see Colin S. Diver, The Judge as a Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 72–73 (1979).
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Sari Horwitz, Arizona Sheriff Rejects Court Monitor; Justice Department Threatens to
Sue, WASH. POST. (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/arizona-sheriff
-rejects-court-monitor-justice-department-threatens-to-sue/2012/04/03/gIQA8P8ztS_story.html.
186
Jason Ryan, DOJ Breaks Off Negotiations With Defiant Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ABC NEWS
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/doj-breaks-off-negotiations
-with-defiant-sheriff-joe-arpaio/.
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Plenty of structural reform cases proceed amicably to negotiated resolutions, without infection by these sorts of pathologies. But Graves v. Arpaio
suggests that these inefficiencies can develop and produce a litigation dysfunction. Unable to predict outcomes, the government official does not want the
agency to settle, but presumably he does not want it to lose at trial either. With
plenty of fees to distribute, the official might opt for delay and obstruction as
his preferred litigation strategy. The seven years of purposeless litigation in
Graves v. Arpaio before Judge Wake assumed control testify to this strategy’s
brutal effectiveness.
2. Trial as a Response
An early, firm trial date can defeat this dysfunctional strategy. Obstruction
fails, because the trial forces a merits resolution in short order. The early, firm
trial date can also solve the principal-agent problem created by the government
official’s incentives to prolong litigation for two reasons. First, to the extent
that the official fears a political backlash from a settlement, trial provides political cover by taking the power to resolve the case out of his hands. Second, a
firm trial date disciplines the official, who might otherwise pay wasteful fees as
political patronage, and his counsel, who might otherwise pocket them happily.187 The reason is simple: “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”188 To have a chance of winning,
the government’s lawyers will have to allocate their scarce resources—their
time and energy—efficiently and productively.189 They cannot pursue obstreperous litigation conducted for purposes of delay, lest they begin trial unprepared.
Prof. Subrin has commented upon the effectiveness of an early trial date,190
and Graves v. Arpaio illustrates its efficacy. Before the summer of 2008, almost no discovery proceeded, and when plaintiffs attempted to engage in discovery, the defendants objected.191 Judge Wake set the trial date on April 24,
2008. The plaintiffs then propounded a sizeable number of discovery requests,
including dozens of deposition notices, and after Judge Wake rebuffed a couple

187

Cf. Stephen N. Subrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513, 520 (2007)
(“Without the realistic threat of trial, with the concomitant threat of imposed sanctions, not
many defendants, if not most, would ever bargain at all.”).
188
See
Mortality
Quotes,
THE SAMUEL JOHNSON SOUND BITE PAGE,
http://www.samueljohnson.com/mortalit.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
189
For a discussion of how early trial dates can contribute to the efficient prosecution of
complex civil litigation, see Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 148–52, 172–73 (2012).
190
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399; Subrin, Uniformity, supra note 6, at 96.
191
E.g., Civil Docket at entries 958, 979, 1165, 1181, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479NVW (D. Ariz.).
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of attempts to delay discovery, the defendants cooperated with little resistance.192
The trial date’s firmness can require intensive case management by the
court.193 Here is where the adversarial relationship between trial and case management that Prof. Subrin posits flips. If the defendants do not cooperate with
the plaintiffs’ discovery requests, made on an expedited basis, the early trial
date only harms the plaintiffs’ cause by leaving them with an impoverished evidentiary record. Judge Wake, for example, had to shepherd Graves v. Arpaio
aggressively during the pretrial period. He issued a detailed scheduling order
that prescribed dates for inspections, interrogatory responses, depositions, and
the exchange of expert reports.194 He held a hearing every third weekday on
discovery matters during the first month of the discovery period, and in the
two-month period he decided nine discovery disputes overall.195 Prof. Subrin
concedes the necessity of intense case management in complex litigation,196 but
he treats this judicial role as something of a necessary evil. The judge qua case
manager becomes an “efficiency expert[],” not an adjudicator, Prof. Subrin insists, and thus “not what it meant to be a wise judge for the past three millennium.”197 In structural reform litigation like Graves v. Arpaio, however, the judge
qua case manager makes the judge qua adjudicator possible.
B. The Democratic Benefits of Structural Reform Trials
Connected to trial’s functional value in structural reform litigation is one of
the contributions to democracy that such trials can make. By countering litigation inefficiencies, trials facilitate representation-reinforcing judicial review
and thereby improve representative government. Structural reform trials do not
derive their democratic force entirely from judicial power, however. They also
provide a singular setting for government accountability, and their often high
political salience can spur mobilization beyond the courtroom.
1. Representation Reinforcement Benefits
Lawyers often bring structural reform cases on behalf of politically marginalized groups, such as prisoners or children in foster care. These groups’
lack of effective representation in electoral politics may explain why the government treats them badly and why they need to sue. When a court remedies
the group’s injuries with an injunction, it reinforces their representation, corrects for a flaw in majoritarian institutions, and, so the argument goes, thereby
192

Id. at entries 1449, 1454.
See Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 856.
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Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 29, 2008).
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improves democratic government.198 Judicial review arguably vests judges with
their most robust decisional power, but this power serves, rather than frustrates,
democratic ends.
Representation-reinforcing judicial review can only succeed if plaintiffs
can put on a good case. Plaintiffs who attack the facial lawfulness of some stated policy may be able to do so without difficulty. Those who challenge the dayto-day administration of a program, in contrast, may have a tougher row to hoe.
These sorts of claims need extensive investigations into the daily operation of
police stations, jails, public schools, and child welfare agencies before plaintiffs
can meet their burden to establish systemic deficiencies in program administration. Government officials can degrade the quality of the plaintiffs’ case by obstructing discovery, and they can delay the moment of adjudication, when representation reinforcement happens, with a strategy of delay. The very political
discreteness of the group seeking injunctive relief may make this strategy all
the more attractive to an official currying support from constituents.
As discussed, an early, firm trial date, made credible by extensive case
management, can respond to this strategy. The substantive law that judges can
employ to ensure the humane administration of government programs through
judicial review loses value unless a procedural pathway to high-quality merits
adjudication exists. Trial can open this pathway and, as such, functions as a
procedural enabler of representation reinforcement.
Of course, not everyone agrees with this pro-democratic understanding of
structural reform litigation.199 Even a representation-reinforcement skeptic,
however, should prefer trial as the best possible way to resolve these cases. A
trial forces the judge into view, where public scrutiny can hold him accountable. As Judith Resnik has argued, quoting Jeremy Benthem, “[p]ublicity is the
very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”200
Also, a trial will likely produce a published set of findings,201 whereas negotiat198

See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 171, at 6–8. For a defense of representation reinforcement
through judicial review as pro-democratic, see Ilya Somin, Democracy and Judicial Review
Revisited, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 287, 291–93 (2004); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980) (asserting that “a representationreinforcing approach to judicial review . . . is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary . . .
entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American system of representative
democracy”).
199
See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 8 (2003).
200
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 530 (2006) (quoting JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355 (Edinburgh, William Tait 1843)); see also
Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s),
5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 24–26 (2011).
201
Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching,
and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 165
(2006) (“Judgment as a matter of law, bench trials, and the like are the grist of the opinion
mill.”).
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ed consent decrees often remain inaccessible except to the unusually intrepid
researcher.202 Structural reform after trial happens in the open, in other words,
lessening whatever democratic affront judicial review might pose.
2. Accountability Benefits
Trials in structural reform cases provide unique moments of accountability
and, in this way, engage the public without juror empowerment. They can force
those responsible for the allegedly deficient program to explain their choices
for its administration in public, as part of a conversation disciplined by evidentiary rules and procedural practices that require honesty and completeness. In
non-legal settings, the official cannot be compelled to explain himself and can
avoid questions that displease him. At trial, the official’s arguments, justifications, and evasions do not disappear into an obscure deposition transcript, and
the official cannot use the luxury of an affidavit, written in advance, to equivocate.203 He has to answer hard questions.
Arpaio’s testimony in a racial profiling case brought against his office illustrates how the disciplined nature of conversation at trial can produce this sort
of accountability. He had made a number of incendiary statements in other settings, including claims in his co-authored book that Mexican immigrants “are
separate from the American mainstream,”204 and that “[a]ll other immigrants,
exclusive of those from Mexico, hold to certain hopes and truths” about the
American dream.205 During a television interview with Glenn Beck, when
asked how he can enforce immigration law, Arpaio said, “what they look like,
if they just look like they came from another country, we can take care of that
situation.”206 When class counsel grilled Arpaio on these statements at trial, he
dissembled and unconvincingly disavowed them.207 At the end of the examination, the lawyer got Arpaio to declare that he had misrepresented his beliefs to
the public on television and in print.208
202

See generally Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should
End the Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515
(2010).
203
The refusal of witnesses to testify in favor of Prop 8, California’s constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage, is illuminating in this respect. After rendering opinions
in depositions and expert reports, most of these witnesses refused to testify at trial. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
204
Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable G. Murray Snow (Bench Trial Day 2, at 278–537) at 352, Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS (D. Ariz. July
24, 2012).
205
Id. at 348.
206
Id. at 364.
207
Arpaio blamed the incendiary statements in his autobiography, for example, on his coauthor. Id. at 349.
208
The lawyer and Arpaio had the following colloquy:
Q: Which is the truth, Sheriff: what you’re saying here in court or what you said in your book?
A: The truth is what I say in court, to the best of my recollection.
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A trial can also produce and organize information about the administration
of government programs and create accountability in this manner. Based in part
on evidence the Graves v. Arpaio plaintiffs presented at trial, the NCCHC
withdrew Maricopa County’s accreditation. Presumably the information necessary to make this judgment existed in deposition testimony and in documents
exchanged in discovery. In this form, however, the information was scattered
and not at the public’s disposal. At trial, the plaintiffs’ lawyers not only had to
publicize this information, they also had to organize it in a manner to help the
finder of fact measure the jails’ compliance with minimum standards of adequacy. Interested observers, like the NCCHC, could more readily learn from
the information packaged thusly. Other actors, such as investigative journalists,
can unearth and organize the sort of information that the plaintiffs’ lawyers assembled for the Graves v. Arpaio trial. But litigators have tools, such as the
discovery rules and subpoena power, that others lack, and trial, with testimony
under oath and cross-examination, may vest this information with a particular
endowment of credibility.
3. Civic Engagement Benefits
Trials in structural reform cases can galvanize civic engagement, even if
citizen-jurors do not actually make legal decisions. During any trial, “a citizen,”
whether a party or a witness, “can effectively tell his own story publicly in a
forum of power.”209 This storytelling is all the more significant in structural reform litigation, since it often involves issues of high political and policy salience. What’s more, this storytelling happens under speech conditions that guarantee equality of treatment. An inmate or a child in foster care shares the stage
equally with government officials. While plenty of governmental processes
may place all participants on formally equal footing, the trial does a better job
than most at actually valuing all voices equally.210
Trials in structural reform cases can also catalyze political participation,
again, due to the significant salience of the issues ventilated in them. A wide
range of community groups organized “pack the court” campaigns during trial
in the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation to engage communities affected

Q: Which is the truth, Sheriff, what you say here in court today or what you tell interviewers like
. . . Glenn Beck on national television?
A: Sometimes when you’re talking to national television it’s much different than testifying,
where you’re going back and forth very quickly, and sometimes . . . the media edits or twists
things around.
Q: . . . Is what you’re saying here in court true or is what you told . . . Glenn Beck true?
A: To the best of my recollection, I’m testifying to what I remember here in court.

Id. at 477–78.
209
BURNS, supra note 11, at 113.
210
Id. at 133 (describing procedural justice literature).
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by police practices in efforts to reform them.211 After each day during the trial’s
first week, organizations led marches and rallies, often departing from the
courthouse steps.212 Advocates likewise used the trial in the Arpaio racial profiling case as a springboard for community organizing and political action.213
During and for several months after the trial, for example, Latino groups registered thousands of new voters in Maricopa County.214 It is hard to imagine advocates using other moments in litigation, such as document review or depositions, to prompt such public action. Perhaps trial succeeds as a galvanizing
mechanism because non-lawyers have an intuitive understanding of the process’s significance, and because its openness enables access to political actors.
C. Expanding Opportunities for Trial-Type Proceedings
An elaborate normative metric is required to measure the democratic value
of structural reform trials against the benefits that can flow from juror engagement in small-scale cases. But this comparison may be academic if the civil trial rate in ordinary litigation will remain depressed, reform proposals like Prof.
Subrin’s notwithstanding. In contrast, trials and trial-type proceedings in structural reform litigation remain distinct procedural possibilities. My impressionistic sense is that this litigation produces trials at a rate higher than that which
commentators commonly assert about complex litigation.215 In July 2013, trial
ended in the New York stop-and-frisk case.216 Trial in the racial profiling case
against Arpaio’s office concluded in August 2012.217 A plaintiff class of about
8,500 children, challenging the constitutional adequacy of Massachusetts’ fos-

211

E.g., First Week of Floyd Stop-and-Frisk Trial Concludes, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR
POLICE REFORM (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.changethenypd.org/news/first-week-floyd-stop
-and-frisk-trial-concludes.
212
Id.
213
Ted Robbins, Ariz. Activists Rally for Votes Against Sheriff Arpaio, NPR (Aug. 2,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/02/157761433/ariz-activists-rally-for-votes-against-sher
iff-arpaio; see also Tim Gaynor, Hundreds in Phoenix March Against Arizona Immigration
Law, REUTERS NEWS (July 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28
/us-usa-arizona-immigration-protest-idUSBRE86R0SJ20120728.
214
See Best of the Press: 11,054, ADIOS ARPAIO (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.adiosarpaio.com/2012/08/best-of-the-press-11054/.
215
E.g., Craig Green, Black-and-White Judging in a World of Grays, 46 TULSA L. REV. 391,
403 (2011) (“Even more than other lawsuits (which is saying something), class actions almost never reach trial . . . .”). But see Gene Mesh, Handling a Mass Disaster as a Class Action, 27 AM. JUR. TRIALS 485, § 105 (“[F]ew class actions for damages, as distinguished from
civil rights class suits for injunctive relief, ever reach the trial stage . . . .”).
216
E.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Criticizes ‘High Error Rate’ of New York Police Stops,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A20. On the likely size of the plaintiff class, see Floyd v. New
York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
217
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013); William Hermann,
Arizona Sheriff Arpaio’s Racial Profiling Trial Ends, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 3, 2012
9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-02/arizona-sheriff-s-civil
-rights-trial-draws-to-close.
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ter care system, rested in May 2013 after presenting its case-in-chief at trial.218
Another trial, involving a 900,000-member class, began in March 2013, to determine whether New York City had planned sufficiently to protect people with
disabilities in the event of a disaster.219 The challenge to overcrowded conditions in California’s prisons went to trial,220 as did an enormous disability rights
case in Milwaukee.221 In March 2014, trial ended in a case challenging the legality of Michigan’s same-sex marriage ban.222
The fact remains that structural reform trials are and always will be rare.
But these cases provide “vivid” litigation episodes, with more public significance than their numbers alone might suggest.223 Trial in even one of them
might yield democratic benefits commensurate with those that a score of smallscale jury trials can produce. The Arpaio racial profiling trial may not have involved jurors in decision-making, but it helped catalyze efforts to register thousands of new Latino voters.
Finally, a modest change to judicial practice can generate the functional
equivalent of trial in a lot of structural reform cases. This is so because, increasingly, merits adjudication occurs at the class certification stage when plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief for systemic harm.
Many, if not most, structural reform cases proceed as class actions.224 Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes in June
2011, class certification motions in these cases succeeded as a matter of course
218

E.g., Milton J. Valencia, Judge Hears Case over Mass. Foster Care System, BOS. GLOBE
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/23/former-foster-child-tells
-federal-court-she-was-neglected-and-over-prescribed-drugs-statesystem/MK5iTKfhw46b9pYQRWI4FN/story.html. On the size of the plaintiff class, see
Vigurs ex rel. Connor B. v. Patrick, 272 F.R.D. 288, 292 (D. Mass. 2011).
219
E.g., Cindy Rodriguez, City’s Treatment of Disabled During Disasters to be Scrutinized
During Trial in Class Action Lawsuit, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/274693-citys-treatment-disabled-during-disasters-be-scrutinized
-during-trial-class-action-lawsuit/.
220
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910, 1928 (2011). For examples of prison conditions
cases going to trial in the years 2012 and 2013, see Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F. Supp. 2d 639
(M.D. La. 2013); Prison Legal News v. Colum. Cnty., 942 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Or. 2013);
Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317,
2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897
F. Supp. 2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012).
221
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 481, 488 (7th Cir. 2012). For examples
of other disability rights cases going to trial during the last three years, see Chester Upland
Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, 284 F.R.D. 305 (E.D. Pa. 2012); CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 888 F.
Supp. 2d 534 (M.D. Pa. 2012); C.K. ex rel. R.P.-K. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-00436, 2012
WL 1082250 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2012); see also DL v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d
1 (D.D.C. 2011).
222
Erik Eckholm, In Gay Marriage Suit, a Battle over Research, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/us/in-gay-marriage-suit-a-battle-over-research.html.
223
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
511 (1986).
224
David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming2015)
(SSRN draft at 6–8).
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and required little more than a perfunctory opinion from the judge.225 Courts
imposed minimal evidentiary obligations on plaintiffs to prove that their claims
met the requirements for certification in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules.226 WalMart, however, announced a more stringent standard for Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Class certification now requires a “common contention
. . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one stroke.”227 Also,
plaintiffs after Wal-Mart bear the evidentiary burden to show that this “common contention” exists with “significant proof.”228
When plaintiffs attack the administration of a government program, service, or institution, as opposed to the facial legality of some stated policy, the
plaintiffs’ common question often asks whether there exists a systemic practice
or custom of illegal behavior that has caused harm to class members. Defendants often deny that this question is relevant to class members’ claims, insisting
that any injuries suffered by class members resulted from idiosyncratic, individualized causes.229 Put differently, defendants deny that a custom or practice
responsible for class members’ harm exists. To resolve the dispute and determine whether the proposed class meets the commonality requirement, the court
must resolve the central merits question for the plaintiffs’ case: does the defendant indeed have an unlawful custom or practice that causes harm to all

225
The Wal-Mart court tightened up the standards for Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality provision and Rule 23(b)(2). Before Wal-Mart, courts routinely declared that each requirement is
all-but-automatically satisfied in structural reform cases seeking injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Kanter ex rel. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994) ((b)(2)); S.S. ex rel. D.S. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ((b)(2)); Kerrigan v. Phila. Bd. of
Election, 248 F.R.D. 470, 474 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Bzdawka v. Milwaukee Cnty., 238 F.R.D.
469, 476 (E.D. Wis. 2006) ((b)(2)); Does I–III v. District of Columbia, 232 F.R.D. 18, 26–29
(D.D.C. 2005) (commonality); Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(commonality); Forbes ex rel. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
((b)(2)); Carter ex rel. Caroline C. v. Johnson, 174 F.R.D. 452, 467 (D. Neb. 1996) ((b)(2)).
226
E.g., Willits v. Los Angeles, No. CV 10-05782, 2011 WL 7767305, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
3, 2011); Shakhnes ex rel. Shakhnes v. Eggleston, 740 F. Supp. 2d 602, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Staley v. Wilson Cnty., No. 3:04-1127, 2006 WL 2401083, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
18, 2006); LV v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 9917, 2005 WL 2298173, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005); Raymond v. Rowland, 220 F.R.D. 173, 179 (D. Conn. 2004).
227
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
228
Id. at 2553; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir.
2008) (providing a “preponderance of the evidence” standard). Cf. George Rutherglen, The
Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 871, 882–83 (2012) (commenting on
the proper evidentiary standard).
229
E.g., Mothersell v. Syracuse, 289 F.R.D. 389, 395–96 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); Parsons v. Ryan,
289 F.R.D. 513, 520 (D. Ariz. 2013); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 597–98 (D. Or.
2012); Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Buchanan ex rel. N.B. v. Hamos, No. 11 C 6866, 2012 WL 1953146, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May
30, 2012).
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class members?230 Moreover, it must do so based on evidence, not the pleadings, because of the “significant proof” obligation Wal-Mart set.
Courts now have a reason—perhaps an obligation—to conduct the equivalent of a bench trial at the class certification stage in structural reform litigation.
A Texas district judge did so in a sizeable foster care reform case after the Fifth
Circuit vacated her class certification order for failing to make commonality
findings “with requisite proof.”231 On remand, the judge held a three-day evidentiary hearing, during which she heard testimony from seventeen witnesses232 and received sixty-two exhibits into evidence.233 She then re-certified the
class. As for commonality, the judge was “persuaded” that the Texas system
suffered from systemic deficiencies that put children at the risk of harm, a conclusion supported by six pages of evidentiary findings.234 Another district judge
relied on trial findings when he re-certified a class of children with disabilities
after the D.C. Circuit vacated an earlier order.235
Most structural reform cases will not proceed to trial. But many will include a class certification stage. Some judges, even after Wal-Mart, decide
class certification motions on the papers, or at most after a couple of hours of
oral argument.236 If a district judge wants a class certification to withstand appellate scrutiny, she should hold the equivalent of a bench trial to gather the
necessary evidence. Findings based on live witness testimony will more likely
230
E.g., Mothersell, 289 F.R.D. at 396; Parsons, 289 F.R.D. at 521; Ligon v. City of New
York, 288 F.R.D. 72, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Strickland ex rel. D.G. v. Yarbrough, 278 F.R.D.
635, 639 (N.D. Okla. 2011); Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07 Civ.
8224, 2012 WL 1344417, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012).
231
Stukenberg ex rel. M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 843 (5th Cir. 2012).
232
Minute Entry for Jan. 22, 2013, Proceedings at 1–2 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11cv-00084); Minute Entry for Jan. 23, 2013, Proceedings at 1–3 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832
(No. 2:11-cv-00084); Minute Entry for Jan. 24, 2013, Proceedings at 1–2 Stukenberg, 675
F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084).
233
Decl. of Christina Wilson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 1, Exs. 1–31 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084);
Decl. of Adriana T. Luciano in Support of Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 1, Exs. 1–31 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084).
234
M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 38–44 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
235
D.L. v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification and Reinstatement of Findings of Liability and Order Granting Relief at Ex. 1 D.L., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:05-cv-01437) (indicating evidence the
plaintiffs relied upon in support of their class certification motion).
236
Parsons v. Ryan, another prison conditions case assigned to Judge Wake, is illustrative.
Judge Wake certified an inmate class in March 2013. He reviewed an extensive paper record
of evidence to determine if a common question sufficient for Rule 23(b)(2) purposes existed.
Agreeing that the plaintiffs met the standard, he concluded that “probative evidence . . . tips
the balance in favor of concluding that the problems identified in the provision of health care
are not merely isolated instances but, rather, examples of systemic deficiencies . . . .” Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 521 (D. Ariz. 2013). Although the finding does not preclude a
different conclusion after trial, Judge Wake effectively decided the key issue of the defendant’s liability, sufficient to support the issuance of injunctive relief. But he did so after an
afternoon of oral argument, not after anything that approximated the thirteen days of trial he
held in Graves v. Arpaio.
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receive deference from an appellate court than findings based on filings
alone.237 Beyond their strategic value, trial-type proceedings at the class certification stage can generate a lot of the democratic benefits I have identified, in a
large number of structural reform cases. This boost requires nothing more than
a change in judicial practice, not even a modest rule reform, to happen.
CONCLUSION
My turn to structural reform litigation differs from Prof. Subrin’s emphasis
on the small-scale private law case as the repository for civil procedure’s democratizing potential in the wake of the civil trial’s demise. While we go in different directions, I am convinced by his insistence on a particular point of departure. For decades, Prof. Subrin has insisted that civil procedure do more than
facilitate dispute resolution efficiently, that the proper procedural regulation of
civil litigation can create important benefits for American democracy. This
must be so.
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E.g., Bertucci Contracting Corp. v. M/V Antwerpen, 465 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2006).

